By Wawa Li & William Ging Wee Dere

The final report of the Public Inquiry on Foreign Interference (PIFI), released by Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue on January 26, has become the subject of intense public scrutiny, especially in the Chinese Canadian community. Coincidentally, it came out days after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Canada with economic warfare. The Foreign Interference Commission examined and assessed interference by China, Russia, and other foreign actors in the 2019 and 2021 general elections at both national and electoral district levels, including evaluating the flow of information to senior decision-makers and the capacity of federal institutions to detect, deter, and counter such interference.

The 16-month inquiry heard from the intelligence and security establishment, civil servants, politicians, and government officials and also held public hearings to investigate the integrity of Canada’s democratic processes and address any adverse impacts resulting from foreign interference. The total cost of the inquiry is over $9 million. The report concluded that foreign interference in the two general elections was inconsequential. 

One solid outcome of the PIFI inquiry is the exposure of the federal foreign interference bureaucracy. There are 23 federal entities involved in responding to foreign interference in government departments, agencies, processes, and deputy minister committees, as well as the offices of the Chief Electoral Officer and Elections Canada. On top of that, there are four review bodies, such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP).

PIFI did not say how many people are employed in the search for foreign interference. However, if jobs are created to find foreign interference, the efforts to do so could be limitless inside this bureaucracy.

Arguably, the inquiry- driven more by sensationalist media coverage, self-serving politicians, and unverified intelligence than by rigorous investigation—relied on shallow reports and baseless witness claims to justify urgent government action. The danger of the narrative manufactured by the final report and through the inquiry about foreign interference, which has been weaponized by the media, law enforcement, and opportunistic political forces, ultimately serves as a tool for domestic repression that unfairly targets the Chinese Canadian community.

Its impact is tangible: it undermines the right to fully participate in the democratic process; it affects the livelihoods of community members—from low-income individuals to academics and diaspora politicians—denying them the right to live equally and safely under both Canadian and Quebec human rights charters while also crippling the essential work of community service centers.

A crucial factor is understanding the profound harm inflicted by this manufactured fear. The true damage lies in manipulating public sentiment to marginalize dissenting voices and restrict democratic rights—a perspective that has been repeatedly sidelined throughout the inquiry—yet it was no less significant.

Examining the Testimonies Behind the Final Report

In the final report, the commission acknowledged that several testimonies lacked definitive links to China, yet unverified claims and opportunistic political narratives have heavily influenced the report. Unsubstantiated accounts—ranging from a formula purportedly identifying foreign agents based solely on community event participation to anonymous testimonies from a community concern group—have been used to paint Chinese organizations as proxies for the PRC.

Selected examples, such as disputes at a museum opening and a controversial case aimed at stifling political debate, are cited without evidence, relying instead on hearsay, innuendos, and stereotypical warnings. One of these warnings is that anyone who expresses a political opinion on the Chinese-language social media platform WeChat is suspected of having connections to China.

The recent fear-mongering (Feb. 7) is the unsubstantiated report by the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE), set up to monitor foreign election interference, about a “malicious” campaign against Liberal leadership candidate Chrystia Freeland on the social media platform WeChat with alleged ties to China.

The PIFI report has given the media and parliamentary committees free rein without having to provide proof. These baseless allegations are particularly alarming in a climate where a new law threatens lifelong imprisonment for anyone labelled a foreign agent, echoing McCarthyite tactics that jeopardize open political discourse and undermine community trust.

Political Opportunism and the Manipulation of Public Sentiment

United by a common thread of opportunism, it is essential to highlight this recurring pattern and hold public figures accountable, as they are expected to act in the best interests of the people while their actions profoundly impact ordinary citizens.

In the report, BC NDP MP Jenny Kwan claimed—based solely on her opinion—that she was excluded from community events. She implied that Chinese Canadian organizations are compelled to align with her mainstream narrative or risk being accused of foreign interference. She even proposed her own formula for identifying foreign agents in Vancouver, suggesting that organizations that once welcomed her but have since stopped doing so are likely proxies for the PRC. As an example, she pointed to the Chinese Canadian Museum’s decision not to invite her to speak at its July 2023 opening as evidence of such interference. However, in retrospect, a Chinese Canadian senator who also attended the event noted that he, too, was not singled out, emphasizing that politicians do not have an inherent right to be invited to community events and that organizers should not be labelled as foreign agents out of personal spite.

Anonymous Testimony: Not Under Oath and Without Cross-Examination, Yet Taken as Truth

Testimonies from the Chinese Canadian Concern Group on Chinese Communist Party Human Rights Violations formed the basis for many conclusions about foreign interference and “transnational repression” in the community. However, the report itself acknowledged that these witnesses testified anonymously, were not under oath, and were not subjected to cross-examination. As a result, much of the report is based on hearsay, political opinions, and innuendo rather than solid evidence.

This group received $503,375.22 from PIFI to testify, collaborated with the Inquiry, and even boasted in its statement (Jan. 30) on the Final PIFI Report: “We are pleased that 15 of our recommendations were wholly or partially adopted, focusing on media, social media regulation, education, government engagement with diaspora communities, election integrity, a whole-of-government foreign interference strategy, combating misinformation, enhancing intelligence transparency, and national security measures.” The political and ideological alignment between this group and the Inquiry Commission could not be more obvious.

The Commissioner’s discussion of Michael Chong—who is considered a potential foreign minister under a probable Prime Minister Poilievre—suffers from the same lack of factual support. Instead, it relies on stereotypes and unfounded claims, such as “your family is in danger,” despite Chong having no close family ties in China or Hong Kong.

The report cites the case of Kenneth Chiu to demonstrate Chinese interference but makes no mention of Senator Yuen Pau Woo’s submission countering Chiu’s innuendos. This omission undermines the rights of the Chinese Canadian (CC) community to engage in open political debate based on political differences and the rights of Chinese media to challenge politicians’ views and actions. The Chiu case, as used by the Commissioner of PIFI, serves as an example of suppressing open political discourse. It is also an attack on WeChat, a Chinese social media platform used by over one million Chinese Canadians.

As Senator Woo cautioned, these examples would be almost amusing if not for the serious consequences of a law that could imprison someone for life if labelled a foreign agent engaged in political activity or merely “associated with” a foreign entity. This could include actions as innocuous as attending a foreign embassy-hosted event, meeting foreign officials, sharing similar views, or maintaining ties with organizations linked to one’s country of origin. Witnesses at the Foreign Interference Inquiry, including prominent human rights activists in Vancouver, have accused Chinese community leaders of being foreign agents without evidence, seemingly aiming to have these leaders prosecuted under Bill C-70—the law intended to “counter foreign interference.”

Paradoxically, the new U.S. Attorney General, Pam Bondi, has ended criminal enforcement of the American Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), upon which C-70 was based. Many Republicans objected to FARA when it was used to charge Trump supporters such as Paul Manafort, illustrating the law’s potential for political weaponization. This highlights the utilitarian nature of foreign interference laws, which can be used to arrest and imprison political adversaries. In contrast, consider the case of Li Tang “Henry” Liang, a Boston hotel worker and union activist charged under FARA in 2023 for advocating peaceful U.S.-China relations. After a six-day trial, he was found not guilty in a Boston court on February 10, underscoring the risks of criminalizing political discourse under such legislation.

The Impact of Foreign Interference Hysteria: Repression and Fear-Mongering Against Chinese Canadian Rights

The PIFI report notably omits how national repression undermines the democratic rights of the Chinese Canadian community—a reality brought into sharp focus by the case of Service à la famille chinoise du Grand Montréal and its sister organization, Centre Sino-Québec. In March 2023, following claims by a Spanish NGO, the RCMP announced to the media that it was investigating alleged clandestine “Chinese police stations” operating from these organizations. To date, no charges have been filed, and the RCMP has provided no details on what constitutes a clandestine police station.

The repercussions have been severe: critical community services—including French-language instruction for new immigrants, legal and employment assistance, senior recreation, and youth internships—have been sharply curtailed due to government funding cuts that followed the media reports. Last spring, the stigmatization stemming from these allegations led to tenant losses, and a bank refused to renew the community center’s mortgage. In a desperate bid to keep the center afloat, board directors used their assets as collateral to secure an extended loan. In March 2024, the organization filed a lawsuit against the RCMP—a suit that remains unanswered.

The only mention of the so-called “Chinese police stations” in the PIFI report is that the RCMP has deployed “disruptive tactics.” One such tactic, for example, involved parking a large bus in the heart of Chinatown in July 2024, with a squad of police officers going door to door, disrupting businesses and intimidating residents. Many in the community remained silent out of fear.

In response to the mounting crisis, the organizations—led by Executive Director Ms. Xixi Li and Carole Cheung, President of the Board of Chinese Family Services of Greater Montreal—launched a defamation lawsuit against the RCMP in March 2024. “Unfortunately, the actions of the RCMP have caused so much suffering,” Cheung stated. The RCMP has twice requested delays in the case—first for nine months and then for an additional four months. If there are no further delays, the RCMP is expected to respond to the lawsuit by May.

Amid these developments, the PIFI report makes sweeping and unsubstantiated claims about the People’s Republic of China (PRC), labelling it the most active perpetrator of foreign interference targeting Canada’s democratic institutions and deeming Canada a “high-priority target”—a claim made without justification, evidence, or logic. Relying heavily on hearsay and insinuation, the report contends that China uses the Chinese Canadian community as a proxy for its “repressive” agenda, thereby casting suspicion on community members. Furthermore, the report’s gratuitous statements—that China seeks to control diaspora communities, shape international opinions, and influence Canadian politicians—blur the line between legitimate security concerns and racist fear-mongering.

A century after the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, a new form of exclusion is emerging—one that does not target all Chinese people in Canada but instead seeks to divide Chinese Canadians into “Good Chinese” and “Bad Chinese.” The so-called “Bad Chinese” are those who hold views that may be sympathetic to the PRC or associate with groups considered adversaries of the West. They are made to feel as though they do not belong here. Traditional anti-racism and human rights groups have largely failed to recognize this subtle yet dangerous threat, often justifying the suppression of rights for these individuals based solely on their perceived political leanings or associations with the Chinese government.

As new forms of exclusion become normalized, the weaponization of foreign interference narratives has fostered suspicion toward Chinese Canadians based on little more than rumours, innuendo, and prejudice. This presumption of disloyalty—targeting those who work to improve relations with China or reject prevailing narratives about a “China Threat”—has led to their stigmatization and, in some cases, adverse consequences for their careers and livelihoods.

What might be dismissed as bureaucratic overreach is, in reality, a deliberate strategy of national repression through intimidation, aimed at suppressing democratic activity within the Chinese Canadian community. Both the hollow allegations and the resulting financial and social devastation experienced by community centers like Chinese Family Services underscore a broader assault on the rights and services vital to the community’s well-being.

How Anti-China Bias and Institutional Racism Shape Policy

The report fuels an anti-China narrative that has intensified anti-Asian hate and led to the discrimination and stigmatization of Canadians with connections to China, particularly Chinese Canadians. Among its 51 recommendations, not one addresses systemic racism, racial profiling, or the exclusion that results from misleading intelligence accusations—all of which undermine the democratic rights of the Chinese Canadian community. Instead, the report relies on vague assertions that cast a dark cloud over Chinese Canadians, reflecting Canada’s broader, problematic perception of China—one that echoes the historic “Yellow Peril.” The only reference to stigmatization suggests that it could benefit foreign actors, rather than acknowledging its real impact. Notably, there was no Chinese Canadian member on the PIFI Commission, further underscoring the institutional biases at play.

This pervasive bias is reinforced by external pressures, groupthink, and domestic policies that have now permeated issues such as housing affordability, school enrollment, and social cohesion. Although scapegoating is a challenge faced by many visible minorities, Chinese Canadians are uniquely affected by the current geopolitical climate. The PIFI Report exemplifies this trend. Meanwhile, the panic over alleged foreign interference has paved the way for draconian measures like Bill C-70, which can be used to silence, stigmatize, intimidate, and even incarcerate Canadians for holding views that might align with a foreign state. Ironically, such a law may deter immigrants with ties to their home countries from engaging in Canadian democracy—a paradox that may have been intended all along.

Canada’s policy toward China is reflected in its treatment of Chinese Canadians. The “Yellow Peril” thinking of the 19th century led to the Head Tax and the Chinese Exclusion Act when China was weak and labelled the “sick man of Asia.” Today, as China asserts itself on the global stage, challenging Western economic dominance, this old fear has resurfaced in the form of the “China Threat” and concerns over Chinese interference. This translates into Sinophobia against Chinese Canadians who do not adhere to the mainstream narrative promoted by PIFI.

Rethinking Canada’s Foreign Interference Narrative

The Public Inquiry on Foreign Interference report largely sidesteps the significant role of U.S.-driven disinformation. While Commissioner Hogue warns that disinformation is Canada’s greatest threat, she omits the fact that the United States is arguably the most consequential source of such falsehoods. By suggesting that neutralizing disinformation from China, Russia, India, and Iran (all BRICS countries) will secure Canada, the report presents a dangerously misleading narrative.

Speaking at the Vancouver Chinese Cultural Centre on February 2, BC Senator Yuen Pau Woo criticized this narrow focus, noting that many Canadian opinion leaders are trapped in a collective delusion shaped by ideological blinders and outdated prejudices. Despite myths about Canada’s unique friendship with China since the 1970s, an instinct to demonize China remains deeply ingrained. While concerns about China’s economic and social challenges exist, Canadians—under the auspices of PIFI—do not have the right to interfere in China’s internal affairs. Portraying China as an existential threat to Canada is, in the senator’s view, sheer insanity.

Furthermore, Senator Woo warned that growing pressure to align with the U.S. on national security matters—spanning foreign influence, espionage, cybercrime, intellectual property theft, and sensitive research collaborations—will inevitably shape Canada’s policy decisions. He argued that Canadian leaders will need considerable courage and wisdom to navigate a security relationship with the U.S. without discriminating against citizens or infringing on their rights. In this climate, Chinese Canadians, especially those with ties to China, risk becoming scapegoats for policies reminiscent of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which followed the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration. Tragically, these measures are likely to gain broad public support, as many Canadians have already accepted the pervasive “China threat” narrative. While not every proponent of this view is overtly racist, the current context provides fertile ground for racist impulses to flourish. To counteract these harms, the senator urged increased awareness and solidarity within the community.

Senator Woo’s Call to Action

In his February 2 speech, Senator Woo stated: