By Guanlan Shen
In recent years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has expanded its public awareness efforts through publications such as Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process and Foreign Interference and You. Together, these reports convey an important message: foreign interference has become one of the long-term national security challenges facing Canada. It is not confined to election periods, nor is it limited to government officials. It can affect democratic institutions, media environments, academic campuses, community organizations, private-sector entities, and the daily lives of ordinary Canadians.
The reports emphasize that foreign interference is not the same as legitimate diplomacy, cultural exchange, business cooperation, or political expression. Rather, foreign interference refers to activities conducted by foreign states or actors acting on their behalf that seek to advance foreign interests through deceptive, clandestine, coercive, threatening, or otherwise manipulative means. Such activities are intended to influence Canadian society, public discourse, government decision-making, or democratic processes.
Canada’s openness makes it both strong and vulnerable. Freedom, diversity, and democratic participation are among the country’s greatest strengths, but these same characteristics can be exploited by hostile actors. Foreign interference often takes advantage of the openness of democratic societies, using legitimate activities as cover for covert influence operations.
One of the defining characteristics of foreign interference is that it rarely appears as direct confrontation. More often, it is a gradual and long-term process. Foreign actors may seek to build relationships, shape narratives, influence communities, and manipulate information environments over time. While such activities may become more visible during elections, many begin years before any vote takes place. The objective is not necessarily to alter the outcome of a single election. Rather, it may be to shape public perceptions, influence policy debates, erode trust in institutions, or even undermine confidence in democracy itself.
The Canadian public and electorate are among the primary targets of foreign interference. Foreign actors may seek to influence how Canadians perceive certain issues, political parties, candidates, or international events. They may amplify social divisions, deepen polarization, and foster distrust. In some cases, the goal is not to persuade people to support a particular position, but rather to create confusion, weaken social cohesion, and diminish public confidence in facts, media, and government institutions.
Elected officials and public servants are also potential targets. Officials at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, along with political staff, policy advisors, and public servants, may be approached by foreign actors seeking to establish influence. Such interactions may initially appear to be routine social engagements, cultural exchanges, or business relationships. However, the underlying objective may be to cultivate long-term access, gather sensitive information, or create opportunities for future influence. Sponsorships, organized visits, resource-sharing arrangements, and relationship-building efforts may all serve as vehicles for influence operations that unfold over many years.
Canada’s multicultural communities can also become targets. Many Canadians maintain family, cultural, economic, or emotional ties to their countries of origin. Some foreign governments attempt to exploit these connections to exert influence within diaspora communities. Individuals may face pressure, intimidation, surveillance, harassment, or social coercion intended to encourage support for particular political positions or discourage criticism.
CSIS identifies this phenomenon as transnational repression—the practice of extending authoritarian control beyond national borders in order to intimidate, silence, or punish individuals living abroad. Transnational repression does not always involve physical violence. It may take the form of surveillance, online harassment, threats against family members overseas, doxxing, reputational attacks, disinformation campaigns, or social exclusion. For those affected, the consequences can include fear, isolation, and a diminished willingness to participate in public life or express their views freely.
The information environment has become another major arena for foreign interference. Foreign actors may attempt to influence traditional media, community media, and social media platforms in order to shape public perceptions. They may spread false narratives, amplify divisive issues, attack trusted sources of information, or exploit online platforms to generate confusion and mistrust. Advances in artificial intelligence and social media technologies have made such operations easier to conduct and more difficult to detect.
The reports distinguish between misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation refers to false or inaccurate information shared without intent to deceive. Disinformation, by contrast, is deliberately created or disseminated with the intention of misleading audiences. Foreign interference activities often rely on disinformation to manipulate public opinion, distort public debate, undermine trust, and exacerbate social divisions.
Universities and research institutions are another area of concern. Foreign actors may seek to influence research agendas, gain access to intellectual property, acquire sensitive technologies, or establish influence through funding arrangements, research partnerships, or talent recruitment programs. Academic collaboration is both legitimate and valuable; however, risks arise when relationships lack transparency or when underlying objectives are intentionally concealed. The reports stress that openness in research and national security are not mutually exclusive and that an appropriate balance must be maintained between international collaboration and risk management.
To achieve their objectives, foreign actors frequently employ a number of recurring tactics. One is elicitation, whereby seemingly ordinary conversations are used to obtain valuable information. Individuals often do not realize that information is being collected because the questions appear harmless or unrelated.
Another tactic is cultivation. Foreign actors may invest significant time and resources in developing friendships, professional relationships, or other forms of trust. Over time, these relationships may lead to requests that initially appear reasonable but gradually evolve into opportunities to obtain information, secure assistance, or exert influence.
A third tactic involves coercion and blackmail. Personal information, financial interests, family connections, or other vulnerabilities may be leveraged to pressure individuals. In some cases, the pressure is directed not at the target directly but at relatives or associates living abroad.
A fourth tactic involves illicit financing and concealed funding arrangements. Foreign actors may channel resources through intermediaries, businesses, or third parties to influence community activities, public discourse, or political participation.
A fifth tactic is cyber activity. Phishing campaigns, malware, account compromise, and data theft have become common tools of modern foreign interference. The primary objective is often not disruption but intelligence collection that can support future influence operations.
A sixth tactic involves information manipulation and disinformation campaigns. Social media platforms allow foreign actors to reach large audiences at minimal cost, making it possible to amplify emotions, generate controversy, and shape public discussions on a broad scale.
In response to these challenges, CSIS emphasizes that foreign interference is not a problem that intelligence agencies can solve alone. Protecting democratic institutions and maintaining public trust require a whole-of-society approach.
For individual citizens, one of the most important safeguards is information literacy. Content that is emotionally charged, anonymously sourced, or designed to provoke outrage and division should be approached with caution. Before sharing information, individuals should seek to verify sources and avoid becoming part of a disinformation ecosystem.
Personal information should also be protected carefully, particularly in online environments. Unusual interest in one’s professional activities, research, organizational affiliations, or personal networks may warrant caution. Invitations, sponsorships, partnerships, or fully funded travel opportunities from unknown sources should be assessed carefully before acceptance.
In practical terms, four warning signs deserve particular attention. People should exercise caution when asked to conceal relationships, funding sources, or the true purpose of an activity. They should be alert when others repeatedly seek access to internal information related to their work, research, or organization. They should be wary when pressure is applied through financial incentives, status, family ties, or other forms of leverage. Finally, they should approach information from unknown sources—especially content designed to inflame emotions or deepen divisions—with skepticism and independent judgment.
For community organizations, transparency remains one of the strongest forms of protection. Clear governance structures, transparent funding arrangements, accountable decision-making processes, and effective conflict-of-interest policies help reduce vulnerability to external influence and strengthen public confidence.
For educational institutions, media organizations, and research communities, awareness and risk literacy are equally important. Understanding the methods of foreign interference does not mean rejecting international engagement. Rather, it enables organizations to identify risks more effectively while maintaining openness and collaboration.
Ultimately, foreign interference is not about identity; it is about behaviour. It is not about where someone comes from, what language they speak, or what cultural connections they maintain. The concern is whether activities involve secrecy, deception, coercion, or manipulation. Cultural ties themselves are not the issue; the issue is whether those ties are being exploited to covertly influence Canadian society.
From a public education perspective, perhaps the most important lesson of these reports is that foreign interference is not an abstract concept confined to government agencies or intelligence professionals. It can emerge through community activities, media ecosystems, online interactions, academic partnerships, political donations, personal relationships, and organizational collaborations. Defending against foreign interference does not require isolation or suspicion of others. Rather, it requires stronger information literacy, procedural awareness, transparency, and independent judgment.
The greatest danger posed by foreign interference is often not any single incident. Instead, it lies in its cumulative effect: the gradual erosion of trust, the weakening of social cohesion, and the growing loss of confidence in democratic institutions themselves. For this reason, countering foreign interference is not only a national security issue. It is also a matter of civic education, media literacy, and democratic culture.
At the heart of these reports is the concept of democratic resilience. The strengths of an open society—freedom, diversity, and inclusiveness—do not require vulnerability. A healthy democracy neither closes itself off because of risk nor abandons vigilance because it is open. It respects facts and evidence while remaining capable of identifying manipulation and deception. It welcomes international engagement while maintaining transparency and independence. It protects freedom of expression while safeguarding the integrity of democratic institutions.
Canada’s long-term strength will depend on its ability to foster transparency, critical thinking, and social resilience while preserving the values of freedom, diversity, and openness that define its democratic character.
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