By Shen Guanlan
The 2025 Public Report of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) presents a clear assessment: Canada’s national security environment can no longer be understood solely through the traditional lenses of terrorism, espionage, or interstate conflict. Instead, Canada faces an increasingly complex threat landscape shaped by geopolitical competition, cyber threats, foreign interference, transnational repression, economic and research security risks, financial vulnerabilities, Arctic sovereignty challenges, youth radicalization, and declining trust in democratic institutions.
One of the report’s most important contributions is its clarification of CSIS’s legal mandate and limitations. Under the CSIS Act, the Service investigates activities that constitute threats to the security of Canada, including espionage and sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and violent extremism, and certain forms of subversion. At the same time, CSIS is explicitly prohibited from investigating lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent. Political opinions, community activities, and peaceful civic engagement do not, in themselves, constitute national security threats.
This distinction appears repeatedly throughout the report and reflects a core principle of Canada’s national security framework. Individuals who support particular political causes or hold controversial opinions cannot be equated with extremists or security threats solely on that basis. National security assessments must focus on behaviours—particularly violence, coercion, clandestine activities, and unlawful conduct—rather than identities, beliefs, or lawful political expression.
The report also outlines CSIS’s threat reduction mandate. Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs) may include information sharing, actions undertaken through partners, or direct interventions intended to reduce security threats. However, these activities remain subject to legal constraints, ministerial accountability, judicial authorization where required, and independent review mechanisms.
Foreign interference and espionage occupy a central place in the report. CSIS assesses that foreign state actors continue to pursue activities in Canada that advance their own interests at the expense of Canada’s national security, sovereignty, and social cohesion. Potential targets include all levels of government, private-sector organizations, industry associations, universities, civil society organizations, and ethnic, religious, and cultural communities across the country.
The report defines foreign interference as activities that are detrimental to Canada’s interests and involve clandestine, deceptive, or threatening conduct. Such activities may undermine democratic institutions, suppress public discourse, weaken public confidence in government, or influence individuals and communities through intimidation and coercion. According to CSIS, common methods include elicitation, cultivation, coercion, illicit or corrupt financing, malicious cyber activity, information manipulation, foreign disinformation, and transnational repression.
Among these threats, transnational repression receives particular attention. CSIS describes transnational repression as efforts by foreign governments or their proxies to intimidate, harass, threaten, harm, influence, or retaliate against individuals beyond their national borders. Targets may include political dissidents, human rights advocates, democracy activists, members of ethnic, religious, and cultural communities, international students, academics, lawyers, medical professionals, journalists, and those who support victims of repression.
The methods employed are diverse and often sophisticated. They may include physical surveillance, intimidation, violence, threats directed at family members abroad, abuse of legal processes, community exclusion, cyber operations, deepfake technologies, online defamation, doxxing, and extortion. The report emphasizes that transnational repression is not simply an issue of foreign political conflict; it directly affects the security, freedom of expression, and civic participation of individuals living in Canada.
The information environment constitutes another major area of concern. CSIS distinguishes between misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation refers to false, inaccurate, or misleading information shared without intent to deceive. Disinformation, by contrast, is deliberately created and disseminated to mislead audiences and achieve strategic objectives. When hostile actors weaponize misinformation for political influence or interference purposes, it becomes a form of disinformation.
The report highlights Russia’s ongoing efforts since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine to weaken Canadian support for Ukraine. Through proxy networks, social media platforms, artificial intelligence tools, and the amplification of divisive social issues, Russian actors have sought to promote Kremlin narratives and deepen political and social divisions within democratic societies.
These developments illustrate a broader reality: modern national security challenges no longer exist solely at borders, military installations, or government facilities. They increasingly emerge within information spaces, online platforms, and public discourse itself.
The 45th Canadian federal election in 2025 is another major focus of the report. CSIS notes that while foreign interference is not limited to election periods, elections create concentrated opportunities for foreign actors to target democratic processes. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force monitored foreign interference and violent extremism threats during the Liberal Party leadership contest, the 45th federal election, and several by-elections.
Although foreign interference activities were detected, the report concludes that no identified incidents compromised Canadians’ ability to participate in a free and fair election. Nevertheless, CSIS emphasizes that attempts by foreign states—either directly or through proxies—to influence democratic processes at all levels of government remain a persistent threat to public confidence in Canada’s electoral system.
The report’s assessment of violent extremism highlights the growing complexity of the threat environment. Contemporary extremist movements can no longer be neatly categorized according to a single ideology. Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE), Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE), and emerging forms of Nihilistic Violent Extremism increasingly overlap in their narratives, aesthetics, grievances, and conspiracy theories.
Many extremists today are motivated not by a coherent political or religious objective but by a combination of xenophobia, accelerationism, nihilism, misogyny, anti-democratic sentiment, anti-2SLGBTQIA+ beliefs, antisemitism, Islamophobia, conspiracy theories, and broader feelings of alienation and despair. CSIS describes this phenomenon as a form of ideological “salad bar,” where individuals draw from multiple grievance narratives simultaneously, making threat identification and prevention increasingly difficult.
The report places particular emphasis on the growing trend of youth radicalization. In recent years, an increasing number of Canadian counter-terrorism investigations have involved minors, including some as young as thirteen years old. According to the report, nearly one in ten CSIS terrorism investigations includes at least one individual under the age of eighteen.
CSIS notes that young people can play a variety of roles within extremist ecosystems, including content creation, dissemination of propaganda, recruitment, leadership, operational planning, and even the commission of violent acts. As a result, the Service highlights the importance of early intervention, appropriate referrals, counter-radicalization initiatives, and mental health support as essential components of a comprehensive prevention strategy.
With respect to Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), the report continues to assess DAESH as one of the most significant global terrorist threats to Western interests. Al-Qaida-related threats also remain relevant despite changes in the global security environment. The report notes that in 2025 two returning extremist travellers were convicted in Canada for their participation in DAESH-related terrorist activities, including Canada’s first conviction of a returning female extremist traveller.
Within the category of Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE), the report highlights the emergence of Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE). Unlike traditional extremist movements that seek a specific political, religious, or ideological objective, nihilistic violent extremists reject conventional moral, social, and political values altogether. Violence itself becomes the objective, with the aim of generating chaos, destruction, and social disruption.
CSIS acknowledges that many activities associated with this environment may fall primarily within the realm of criminality rather than national security. Nevertheless, the Service remains concerned about the significant risks posed by online communities, youth involvement, and the potential for serious violence. Since 2022, CSIS has contributed to the disruption of at least twenty-four violent extremist plots, resulting in arrests, terrorism peace bonds, and other preventative measures.
The section addressing Politically Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE) is framed in part by the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Air India Flight 182, the deadliest terrorist attack in Canadian history. The attack killed 329 people, most of whom were Canadian citizens.
Importantly, the report draws a clear distinction between peaceful advocacy for Khalistan and violent extremist activity. Support for Khalistan expressed through lawful, non-violent political advocacy is not considered extremism. CSIS emphasizes that only a small number of individuals who use Canada as a base to facilitate, fundraise for, or support acts of violence primarily occurring in India are considered Khalistani extremists. This distinction reflects a broader principle repeated throughout the report: national security assessments must focus on violence, coercion, clandestine activity, and unlawful conduct—not merely on political viewpoints, identity, or community affiliation.
Economic and research security constitute another major theme. As a trading nation and global innovation hub, Canada possesses advanced research capabilities and emerging technologies that are highly attractive to foreign state actors. According to CSIS, hostile states may seek access to Canadian research, technology, expertise, and intellectual property through corporations, universities, research partnerships, investment arrangements, talent recruitment programs, and front organizations.
The report identifies artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and other emerging technologies as areas of particular concern. Reference is also made to Canada’s Sensitive Technology List, which covers eleven categories of technologies considered strategically significant. The loss of intellectual property and sensitive technologies not only undermines Canada’s economic competitiveness but may also strengthen the military, intelligence, or strategic capabilities of hostile states.
The report also examines financial security, foreign investment review, and the regulation of payment service providers. CSIS assesses that financial technologies, virtual assets, and stablecoins create new national security challenges. The Service contributes to Canada’s anti-money laundering, anti-terrorist financing, and counter-proliferation financing efforts through cooperation with the Department of Finance, FINTRAC, OSFI, the Canada Revenue Agency, and international partners, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
In 2025, CSIS also assumed responsibilities under the Retail Payment Activities Act to support national security reviews of payment service providers. The Service continues to provide intelligence assessments under the Investment Canada Act to assist the Government of Canada in reviewing foreign direct investments that may pose national security concerns.
Critical infrastructure protection remains a core national security priority. Canada’s ten critical infrastructure sectors—including finance, energy and utilities, food, transportation, government, information and communication technologies, health, water, safety, and manufacturing—are considered high-value targets for foreign interference, espionage, sabotage, service disruption, and intellectual property theft.
The report notes that the Building Canada Act, which came into force in 2025, is intended to facilitate the development of projects deemed to be in the national interest. Protecting such projects from foreign interference and hostile influence forms an increasingly important aspect of national security planning.
Critical minerals and Arctic security represent another major strategic concern. As global competition for critical minerals intensifies, Canada faces both opportunities and risks. The country seeks to position itself as a reliable supplier of critical minerals while guarding against excessive dependence on foreign actors and preventing hostile states from establishing long-term influence through investment, research collaboration, or infrastructure projects.
The Arctic occupies a particularly important place in the report. As climate change reduces sea ice and increases accessibility, Arctic shipping routes, natural resources, scientific research opportunities, and strategic military considerations are attracting greater international attention. CSIS indicates that it will continue expanding its presence and capabilities in the Arctic while working closely with territorial governments, Indigenous governments, organizations, industry stakeholders, and local communities to improve awareness of national security risks.
Counter-proliferation remains an important responsibility for the Service. CSIS warns that Canadian technologies, research, and expertise may be targeted by hostile states seeking to advance weapons of mass destruction programs or sophisticated conventional military capabilities. The Service investigates efforts by foreign actors to illegally acquire sensitive Canadian technologies, services, research, and intellectual property, while also supporting Canada’s export control and sanctions regimes.
Cybersecurity is another area of growing concern. Canada’s democratic institutions, advanced economy, innovative research sector, and universities make it an attractive target for cyber espionage, cyber-enabled foreign interference, and disruptive cyber activity.
Working alongside the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, CSIS investigates and helps mitigate threats posed by hostile cyber actors. The report identifies Salt Typhoon, a threat actor associated with the People’s Republic of China, as having targeted Canadian telecommunications providers in 2025, potentially compromising customer communications data. The report also notes that non-state cyber actors aligned with Russian geopolitical objectives continue to target critical infrastructure throughout NATO countries.
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