Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Process and Democratic Institutions Submission by Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group

July 18, 2024

 

Disclaimer

This submission does not intend to dismiss allegations of foreign interference; rather, we advocate for Canada to establish a systematic approach to prohibit foreign government interference.

Part I – Introduction: About Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group and Why We Submit Our Opinion

The Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group Association of Canada (SAAHCAG) is a not-for-profit and non-partisan community organization based in British Columbia, dedicated to fostering social harmony, combating racism, and strengthening community ties among Canadians of Asian descent.

Our mission is to enhance public understanding of racism and hate crimes within Canada, and to empower our communities to actively report and monitor these incidents. We are committed to eradicating racism and ending hate crimes by advocating for social equality and embracing multicultural values. We actively disseminate information about Canada’s laws, government initiatives, law enforcement strategies, and both international and national efforts aimed at combating racism and hate crimes. We recognize the serious risk foreign interference poses to Canada’s democratic integrity and advocate for vigilance and preventive measures against such threats. While we appreciate the efforts of the Foreign Interference Commission to address these issues thoroughly, we remain concerned about the risks of inequality, marginalization, and stigmatization that may affect our community during the public inquiry process.

After thoroughly reviewing the materials from Phase 1 of the public hearings on foreign interference in federal elections, and drawing from our own experiences and knowledge of the Chinese community, WeChat, Chinese social media, and the Chinese language, we offer our insights and analysis on some of the evidence and documents presented by the complainants (MP Jenny Kwan, MP Han Dong, MP Michael Chong, MP Erin O’Toole, and Mr. Kenny Chiu).

We are concerned that the partial analysis presented in these reports could lead to misinterpretations about the Chinese Canadian community by both government officials and the general public. Following the passage of Bill C-70, which is now law or soon will be, ambiguities in defining which activities must be registered could result in excessive registrations and suspicion. This may dampen the enthusiasm of Chinese Canadians, particularly first-generation immigrants, to engage with Canada’s democratic processes such as running for office, voting, and exercising freedom of speech. Such developments could impede the integration of minority groups into Canadian society, foster social divisions, undermine multicultural policies, and weaken the democratic fabric of Canada.

Part II: Existing Evidence Analysis and Concerns

Our submission will systematically address these issues and outline our concerns in the following alphabetical sequence:

A.    MP Jenny Kwan – Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions: Written Closing Submissions of MP Jenny Kwan for Phase I (abbreviated as JKD)
1. Misinterpretation of the term “Chinese” leading to further confusion:

On August 28, 2021, Fred Kwok organized a “meet-and-greet banquet” at Floata Seafood Restaurant for the Liberal candidate of the Chinatown district and Chinese voters in Chinatown, incurring expenses of CAD 1,559.04 for the venue (hereafter referred to as the Floata event).

In section B2 of JKD,[1] it is asserted that the Floata event was influenced by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This allegation is based on a Chinese-language invitation distributed by Fred Kwok via WeChat prior to the event.

The original Chinese invitation was written like this:

“剩2個多星期,就是聯邦大選。華人及僑社多年以來都是被忽視的一群人。這次聯邦大選,華人必要展示投票力量。現在這位自由黨初次在溫哥華東區參選。我們華人也應該讓政界認識華社力量。印度人已經有很大的影響力。中國人也應該展現一個團結。明天早上-富大酒樓,11:30午餐,多少人去都可以。不用付費。各位可以找些朋友到場,顯示關注。將來勝出, 起碼多幾個議員會関心中國人的議題。”

The translation is as follows:

“The federal election is coming in just over two weeks. Chinese and Chinese community have long been a neglected group. In this federal election, Chinese must show their voting strength. Now, this Liberal Party candidate is running for the first time in Vancouver East. We Chinese should also let the politicians know the power of the Chinese community. Indians already have had a great impact. Chinese should also show unity. Tomorrow morning at Floata Restaurant, 11:30 am. Everyone is welcome to the lunch. No need to pay. You can invite friends to attend and show their concern. If the candidate is elected, at least there will be a few more MPs who care about the issues of Chinese.”

In the document JKD, the term “Chinese” is a critical piece of evidence. JKD interprets “Chinese” to refer specifically to PRC nationals. However, within diverse ethnic communities, people often use their ancestral country’s name to denote their ethnic group. For example, just as Koreans, Iranians, and Italians might refer to their respective ethnic communities, the term “Chinese” within these contexts typically does not imply residents of China itself. Fred Kwok’s original use of “Chinese” intended to denote the Chinese Canadian community.

In section B2 of JKD, the term “Indians” is translated to mean “The Indian (South Asian) people,” clarifying that it refers to Indian Canadians or South Asian Canadians, rather than individuals residing in India or representing the Indian nation or government. Conversely, the term “Chinese” in the same section, which grammatically and contextually aligns with “Indians,” is translated as “PRC” and interpreted to imply the PRC government. This translation suggests that Fred Kwok’s intentions were to support a candidate favorable to the PRC government. This interpretation could be seen as either a significant misunderstanding or a deliberate misguidance.

2. Conclusions based on assumptions and conjecture:

In section B4 of JKD, following the election, MP Kwan’s assistant, Mr. Yiu, inquired about the cost of a banquet at Floata Restaurant and received a quote of CAD 2,500 per table. From this, MP Kwan deduced that the actual cost of Fred Kwok’s event at Floata should have been between CAD 2,500 and CAD 3,000, leading her to speculate whether the PRC government might have subsidized the difference, given that Kwok’s payment was just over CAD1,500+.[2] This supposition is entirely based on conjecture without concrete evidence. Relying on assumptions and conjectures as facts would contravene the principles of Canadian justice, potentially fostering undue suspicion of foreign interference, imagining adversaries, and compromising societal trust.

B. Mr. Kenny Chiu – RRM Canada Open Data Analysis (Oct 08, 2021)[3]

This analysis presents a chronological listing of misinformation disseminated by Canadian Chinese media outlets and related articles, alongside content from PRC state media such as Xinhua. It suggests that information originating from the PRC is being propagated in Canadian media, particularly through the WeChat platform. This activity is purported to enable the PRC government to exert influence over Chinese Canadian voters and potentially interfere in Canadian electoral processes.

While the evidence listed in this report is solid, it is incomplete, overlooking some important facts.

1.   Ignoring the earliest source of the “misinterpretation” of Mr. Chiu’s private proposal Bill C-282

On the same day the bill was introduced (April 13, 2021), the Chinese social media platform “Yellow River Report” (YRR), which Mr. Chiu strongly supports, aired a special interview program detailing this proposal. The video was uploaded to their YouTube channel immediately .[4] The prompt launch of this program on the evening of the bill’s proposal suggests that it was pre-arranged by Chiu, as organizing guests and previewing the program would require advanced planning.

The interview highlighted that, despite the bill being labeled as “foreign,” its primary focus is on the PRC, as mentioned around the 6-minute mark. Given that it was introduced by Chiu, a Chinese Canadian official, the bill holds significant implications. It aims to regulate not just foreign government agencies but also individuals, companies, and collectives associated with foreign governments, which could include a variety of institutional entities, as detailed starting at the 9-minute mark of the program.[5]

The interview clarified that the passing of the bill would raise awareness within the Chinese community, prompting individuals to consider if they fall under the category of foreign agents. Those identified as foreign agents might opt not to register, but they would then face potential consequences unless they cease their activities (mentioned around the 20-minute, 40-second mark). The discussion also specified who is required to register: aside from diplomatic entities like embassies and consulates, any person or institution in Canada that is under the control of, or engaging in activities for, a foreign government, whether directly or indirectly, formally or informally, must register (as noted starting at 23 minutes, 29 seconds).[6]

The interview discussed the issue of the PRC’s alleged “control” over activities within Canada, highlighting claims that “the PRC has deployed numerous spies to infiltrate Canada, manipulate mainstream media, dominate Chinese associations, and use financial incentives and allurements to compromise Canadian officials.” It further noted that a decade ago, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had already warned the Canadian public about the risks of foreign interference. At that time, leaders from Chinese associations and community figures, [7]including then MLA Jenny Kwan, publicly criticized these allegations as racially discriminatory. This response was suggested to indicate a significant level of influence exerted by the PRC over the Chinese Canadian community at that time (noted around the 26-minute, 40-second mark).

The program discussed the requirements for registration under Bill C-282, stating that “any individual or group involved in activities on behalf of foreign institutions, whether knowingly or unknowingly, formally or informally, fits the definition of a foreign agent and is required to register within ten days.” For example, it explained that if a cultural counselor from the Vancouver Consulate instructs a person or a group registered in British Columbia to organize events for the Mid-Autumn Festival, China’s National Day, or the Lunar New Year Festival, and they comply, then that person or group qualifies as a foreign agent and must register. Additionally, it was noted that “local organizations helping the PRC Ministry of Lunar New Year Festival to arrange Spring Festival events in Vancouver are classified as foreign agents and should also register”  [8](noted starting at 47 minutes, 46 seconds).

Chiu participated in interviews on this channel multiple times before and after the 2021 election. He discussed his proposal, the election, and his subsequent loss, yet he never corrected any of the program’s content. On the contrary, he has consistently affirmed that the channel presents factual information, has not misconstrued Bill C-282, and expressed a wish that all Chinese media would emulate the rigor, seriousness, and truthfulness of the YRR, avoiding the dissemination of false information.

The “misinformation and errors” concerning C-282 mentioned in the current RRM report align closely with the statements made during the program. This raises the question: what does Chiu actually consider “misinformation and errors”? Why is the same content deemed accurate when Chiu presents it on the YRR channel but considered incorrect when reported by other media outlets?

This program was the first to release all such information (on the day C-282 was proposed), making it the original source.

2.   Neglecting the diversity of Chinese media content

Even if Chinese Canadian voters exclusively engage with Chinese media, the content available during elections is varied. Criticism of the Conservative Party and Kenny Chiu represents just a small portion of the overall media content. There are also strong opinions and voices actively criticizing the Liberal Party leader and his policies within the Chinese media. However, despite the criticisms, there are perspectives and voices that support the Conservative Party and Chiu. For example, some Chinese websites that repost information from the PRC also feature content favorable to the Conservative Party and Chiu. An article on Vansky commends several Chinese Canadian Conservative candidates, including Chiu, praising his long-standing dedication to the Steveston-Richmond East constituency and his past role as a school trustee.[9] The RRM report identifies Vansky as one of the platforms that disseminates PRC information.[10]

In addition to platforms like WeChat and various self-media, the Chinese Canadian community in British Columbia (B.C.) also accesses a range of other Chinese media outlets. These include Sing Tao Daily, Ming Pao, AM1320, FM96.1, and OMNI, which operates under Rogers Communications as a multicultural channel. These outlets are considered highly credible sources of Chinese-language information within the community.

Therefore, even if Chinese Canadians rely solely on Chinese media, they are exposed to a diverse array of information, not limited to content from the PRC.

3.   Overlooking Chinese Canadian voters’ consumption of English media

Chinese Canadian voters also access information in English, and some do not speak Chinese at all. It raises the question: What proportion of their media consumption involves content related to the PRC?

4.   Ignoring the diversity within the Chinese Canadian community

Many Chinese Canadians, especially those not originally from Mainland China, may not understand Mandarin or regularly engage with Chinese media, websites, or WeChat content. Furthermore, those accustomed to traditional Chinese characters often do not read content in simplified Chinese, which is typically used by media disseminating PRC information.

Assuming that those who do read simplified Chinese during elections follow PRC-related platforms, the diversity of content they encounter daily means that they are not exclusively consuming PRC information. Consequently, the percentage of Chinese Canadian voters accessing PRC content through Canadian media is relatively small.

In Chiu’s constituency, Chinese-speaking Canadian voters do not constitute the majority. According to Elections Canada, in 2021, the constituency had a population of 102,230, with 50,185 English-speaking households and 31,030 Cantonese and Mandarin-speaking households. Voter turnout for the federal election was 53%. Of the Chinese-speaking residents, a majority are Cantonese speakers from Hong Kong, and a significant number of Mandarin speakers are from Taiwan. It raises questions about how many PRC immigrants reside in this constituency and how many are citizens eligible to vote.

Therefore, it is crucial to discern not just the number of PRC immigrants in the constituency, but specifically those who do not consume English media or other Chinese content, who exclusively consume Chinese articles critical of Chiu, and who are naturalized Canadian citizens eligible to vote.

5.   WeChat subscribers and readership are global, mainly from the PRC

WeChat is accessible globally, and its user statistics reflect a worldwide audience. In the PRC, where platforms like Google and YouTube are restricted, many people rely on WeChat to stay informed about international news, including developments in Canada. As a result, WeChat channels that cover foreign affairs, such as Canadian topics, attract a significant readership from within the PRC.

In fact, a considerable portion of WeChat’s subscribers and active readers are based in the PRC. This is evident from comments on articles about Canada, where the current version of WeChat shows the location of commenters. For instance, a discussion on the Partnership Power Distance Index (PDI) between China and Canada received over 1,000 views and included a comment from someone in Guangdong province,[11] a province of PRC. Similarly, an article about an anti-discrimination hotline received similar attention, with a comment coming from Sichuan province[12], another province of PRC. Both articles originated from Canada-based WeChat accounts, highlighting the platform’s role in bridging information across borders.

6.   Overlooking Canada’s presumption of innocence principle and violating the Canadian Human Rights Act

If official PRC media expresses certain viewpoints and Chinese Canadians display similar behaviors, it is often presumed that these individuals are influenced by the PRC, raising suspicions about their loyalty. This leads to increased scrutiny of their actions and statements to uncover supposed underlying motives. Such practices unfairly target particularly the newer generations of Chinese immigrants from the PRC, accusing them of harboring certain thoughts. This approach contradicts the principle of presumption of innocence upheld in Canada and infringes upon rights protected under the Canadian Human Rights Act, representing a dangerous precedent.

In conclusion, while investigations indicate that PRC media disseminates information, which some Canadian media then relay or distort to align with PRC narratives, there is no definitive proof that Chinese Canadian voters are influenced or controlled by the PRC. Furthermore, the report’s mentioned misinterpretations of Bill C-282 stem from an interview on a Canadian Chinese social media platform, which Chiu endorsed specifically to mark the introduction of the bill.

C. Mr. Kenny Chiu – Stage 1 Interview Summary: Kenny Chiu

In the evidence provided by Chiu during this interview, there are several misunderstandings or partial interpretations of the facts, which overly narrow the reasons for his electoral defeat. Examples include:

1. Inconsistencies with facts

In paragraph 50, Chiu states that he was not invited for an interview by “Vancouver Chinese Radio.”[13]

However, it’s possible that Chiu’s recollection is inaccurate, and he might be referring to the interview series organized by the Chinese Canadian Goto Vote Association (CCGTV) and Rise Weekly. These interviews aimed to familiarize voters with the policies of various parties and boost electoral participation among the Chinese Canadian community, which has historically been low.

During the invitation phase for candidates, Rise Weekly made efforts to contact Conservative candidates in Vancouver but did not receive any responses. This lack of engagement from the party led to their absence, not a deliberate exclusion by the organizers. For example, in the 2023 Concert in the Park event co-hosted by CCGTV, invitations were extended to all MPs and MLAs in the Greater Vancouver area. A Conservative MP confirmed her participation but ultimately did not attend as planned.

Initially, the Liberal candidate contacted by CCGTV was Josh Vander Vies from Vancouver, who ultimately withdrew at the last moment. Subsequently, CCGTV approached Liberal candidate Brea Huang Sami, who then recommended inviting Parm Bains to participate in the interview.

2. Challenges in understanding Canadian democracy and perceptions of voters with PRC backgrounds

In paragraph 57, Chiu suggests that the same organizer who facilitated a meet-and-greet for senior voters on his behalf also arranged a similar event for Liberal candidate Parm Bains, noting that the organizer was a retired professor from the PRC. Chiu interprets this as potential evidence of foreign interference[14]

However, it is quite common for Chinese Canadians, including retirees like the professor, to actively volunteer in the community to mitigate electoral apathy. These volunteers frequently organize events like meet-and-greets to increase awareness and engagement, particularly among elderly voters who may face language barriers.

The reaction of surprise from Chiu that the same group of seniors met with both a Conservative and a Liberal candidate reflects a misunderstanding of Canada’s inclusive democratic practices, where it is standard for voters to engage with multiple candidates. The assumption that the event was influenced by the PRC, simply based on the organizer’s previous academic position in China, is unfounded and reflects a bias. Many immigrants from the PRC have professional backgrounds in institutions that are commonly led by the CCP, such as hospitals, schools, and tech companies. To suspect all such individuals would be unreasonable.

Moreover, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms[15] clearly states that every individual is equal before the law without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, among other factors. Chiu’s suspicions, therefore, contradict the spirit of the Charter, which aims to protect against such biases.

3. Overly simplifying the reasons for his defeat in the election

In paragraph 58, Chiu found it unusual that his support diminished significantly in 2021 compared to 2019, attributing this decrease to possible PRC manipulation of his electoral defeat. However, in Canadian elections, fluctuations in voter support are common and reflect the dynamic nature of democracy, where the electorate’s judgment ultimately determines the outcomes, showcasing the system’s robustness. Chiu’s victory in 2019 followed by a loss in 2021 could stem from various factors.

The most straightforward explanation is the voters’ shift in support away from this former MP. In Canada, elected officials are evaluated based on their performance and actions, rather than just their rhetoric. If an official’s performance falls short of the electorate’s expectations, it can lead to disappointment and disillusionment, often summarized by the phrase “familiarity breeds contempt.” For instance, many members of the Richmond community questioned whether Chiu’s priorities lay with Richmond East or with foreign concerns, noting his considerable focus on Hong Kong issues. This perception could have influenced his support levels among constituents.

Chiu was initially elected as an MP in 2019 after serving as a school trustee in Richmond. The role of a school trustee, which is part-time and local, vastly differs in responsibilities, skill demands, and time commitment from those of a full-time federal MP, who must manage duties both in Ottawa and in his home constituency. Following his electoral defeat, during a Cantonese radio interview, a caller criticized Chiu for his perceived inactivity during his term.[16] Chiu used this critique to highlight what he considered misunderstandings by voters about his achievements. However, in Canada, elected officials are typically evaluated by the electorate based on their performance rather than their own assertions, suggesting that Chiu might need to more deeply consider the reasons behind his electoral loss.

Additionally, the platform in election campaigns significantly influences election results. Some analysts attribute Chiu’s loss to his stance on environmental issues, which are vital to his constituents.[17] His past opposition to homosexuality, noted by local media in 2015[18] and 2019,[19] also likely affected voter perception.

Between the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, there was a decrease in voter turnout from 67% to 62.6%.[20] Specifically, in the Steveston-Richmond East constituency, the number of valid votes fell from 41,591 in 2019 to 38,949 in 2021. This lower voter turnout could have contributed to the variation in votes received. It’s important to recognize that electoral defeat is rarely caused by a single factor.

Moreover, the reasons behind voter decisions can be multifaceted. Some voters may base their choices more on personal affinity for a candidate rather than on party platforms. For example, in an interview with the “Yellow River Report,” a Richmond resident and PRC immigrant who supports the Conservative Party and Chiu expressed disappointment that he could not vote for Chiu because he was in a different constituency, represented by Alice Wong, whose personality he did not favor.[21]

D. MP Michael Chong – Factual Phase (Stage One) Submissions

In Mr. Chong’s report, certain instances clearly lack factual basis and adequate logical deduction, while also indicating a lack of essential understanding regarding Chinese Canadian voters.

1.  Disagreement is a freedom, not a reason for conviction.

“Second, during GE44, Mr. Chong participated in a virtual all-candidates’ debate in the Township of Puslinch. Puslinch is a rural township with about 7,000 people, most of whom know one another. At the event, an individual appeared and asked questions in Mandarin-accented English. This person claimed Mr. Chong’s positions on the PRC were responsible for the rise of anti-Asian discrimination and hate in Canada and accused the Conservatives of mimicking American foreign policy on China. No one from Puslinch that Mr. Chong spoke to could identify this person.”[22]

In the referenced discussion, a participant with a Chinese accent criticized Mr. Chong’s international policies during an online event, and he was unrecognized by other attendees. However, these points alone do not substantiate any coercion, instruction, or influence by a foreign government, specifically the PRC. The democratic framework of Canada, protected under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ensures the freedom to express diverse viewpoints, including support or opposition to any policy.

If Mr. Chong perceives those disagreeing with his platform as adversaries or as being manipulated, it suggests a misunderstanding of democratic principles. Many people might share similar perspectives to the speaker, as evidenced by other polls and discussions beyond this specific event.

Additionally, it’s worth noting that the viewpoint expressed by the speaker is not uncommon. For instance, a 2023 social survey in the United States found that 61% of respondents shared similar opinions.[23]

Furthermore, using an “accent” as a basis for determining foreign influence is problematic and can lead to discrimination based on nationality or ancestry. This approach is particularly risky as it could foster suspicions about the loyalty of entire communities based on their immigrant origins. Historically, such suspicions have resulted in the unjust treatment of ethnic communities, including German, Italian, Ukrainian, and Japanese Canadians, by the Canadian federal government during the World Wars.

The argument that “No one from Puslinch recognized the speaker” as evidence of foreign interference is also weak. In a community like Puslinch with thousands of residents, not everyone is acquainted with each other.

Among the Chinese Canadian population, individuals from the PRC are a significant group. The 2021 election results show that the Conservative Party received a 33.72% vote share, indicating that around 70% of voters chose other parties. It might be inferred that a similar proportion of Chinese Canadian voters also did not support the Conservative Party. To suggest that these individuals were influenced by foreign interference would unfairly suspect the majority of Chinese Canadians of mainland descent of such influence.

If this rationale were adopted more broadly by political figures, implying that Chinese Canadians with PRC heritage cannot express criticism of policies without being seen as influenced by the PRC government, it would effectively marginalize all Chinese Canadians with PRC ancestry from participating in Canadian politics. This would be akin to establishing a new, informal version of the Chinese Exclusion Act, excluding a significant portion of the community based on ancestry.

2.   “Someone told me” or “hearsay” shouldn’t be taken as evidence.

“Mr. Chong participated in three roundtables with members of the Chinese community following GE44. They told him that they had been subject to high volumes of disinformation. They explained that a Vancouver-area radio station had been told not to mention Conservative candidate Kenny Chiu’s name on air. Finally, they advised that they experience the PRC as having a stronger presence in Chinese communities in Canada than the government of Canada.”[24]

Since the attachments mentioned on the PIFI website’s public report are not accessible, it remains unclear which three roundtable meetings Mr. Chong participated in with members of the Chinese community. Consequently, there is a notable lack of specific evidence to support the details in this statement.

“They told him that they had been subject to high volumes of disinformation.” What information did these individuals encounter? Based on what criteria did they determine it was “disinformation”?

“They explained that a Vancouver-area radio station had been told not to mention Conservative candidate Kenny Chiu’s name on air.” Which radio station had this rule? How was this rule communicated? Is the rule verified to exist or a rumor? From the standpoint of communication studies, information is often distorted intentionally or unintentionally during transmission. That is “message distortion is the alteration or misinterpretation of information during communication.” Therefore, evidence is needed to determine the truth, rather than relying solely on “someone told me” or “hearsay.”

Even if Mr. Chong’s oral reports are factually based and the incidents verified, they do not conclusively indicate foreign influence. Elections often give rise to a variety of unforeseen occurrences. For example, Mark Twain’s “Running for Governor,” written in 1870, captures numerous election-related social phenomena, and its observations remain pertinent more than a century later.

Moreover, Mr. Chong appears to overestimate the influence of the PRC government on Chinese Canadians. Many Chinese immigrants, particularly those not from mainland China, have minimal interactions with the PRC government, differing significantly in language, script, and social media usage. For instance, they often do not speak Mandarin, are unfamiliar with simplified Chinese characters, and do not use PRC-origin social media platforms like WeChat. Additionally, even Canadian citizens from mainland China, who have the right to vote, seldom engage with the PRC government or its consulates in Canada, except for routine matters like visa applications.

Therefore, Mr. Chong’s evidence is insufficient to demonstrate his claimed extensive existence of FI.

E. MP Erin O’Toole – Submission to the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions on behalf of the Honourable Erin O’Toole, PC, CD

The “evidence” of FI listed in this report lacks factual basis and continues to demonstrate a lack of understanding and stereotyping towards the Chinese Canadian community, while also revealing unfamiliarity with similar international legislation. Here is a detailed analysis:

1. Linear reasoning that members of diaspora communities vote against Candidates because of foreign agent interferences.

“MP Jenny Kwan and Mr. Kenny Chiu both testified to being deplatformed by community organizations because of the views they expressed in relation to China. They testified to not being invited to events and to no longer being interviewed by community media publications. They attributed this to instruction from proxy agents of the PRC. The government did not act upon these allegations.”[25]

MP Jenny Kwan and Mr. Kenny Chiu’s testimonies seemed to conflict with the democratic value of accepting criticism. They stated that they were not welcomed by local community organizations but did not elaborate on the reasons for this lack of acceptance. Instead, they speculated that it was due to influence from PRC agents, with the only cited support being Mr. Basler’s testimony.[26]

However, it’s important to note that members of the Conservative Party, including Mr. Chiu, have been featured in Chinese-language media. For example, a well-known Chinese forum in Vancouver published an article endorsing Mr. Kenny Chiu prior to the 2021 Election. This suggests some level of community support and media coverage which contradicts the allegations of exclusion. Given the sensitive nature of these accusations, more substantial evidence and witness testimony would be necessary to substantiate such claims.[27]

Canadian political scientists have noted that diaspora communities are particularly sensitive to Canadian foreign policy.[28] Reflecting on the 2021 election,[29] Mr. Kenny Chiu acknowledged that some individuals might have been displeased with his stance on Canada-China relations. However, he attributed this discontent to organized efforts by Chinese government agents, suggesting a pattern where any opposition or negative events are ascribed to foreign interference.

John Stuart Mill, a proponent of free speech, argued that the “free competition of ideas is the best way to find truth.”[30] Following this principle, Chinese Canadians should freely discuss what they believe is best for Canada’s foreign policy. In a democratic system, people should have access to comprehensive information, enabling them to make informed decisions. Concerns arise about the reasoning of Mr. O’Toole and Mr. Chiu, particularly their propensity to attribute dissent to foreign interference, potentially as a means to censor differing views. The exposure of Chinese Canadians to a variety of media content underscores that the government or any political entity should not impose censorship or make unilateral decisions for citizens, as the free exchange of ideas is fundamental to democracy.

2.   Transnational corporations monitoring

“One of the difficulties with assessing the extent of foreign interference and misinformation is that Canada does not have a relationship with, or an understanding of, foreign social media platforms. As noted by Ms. Dobner of the SITE TF:

As I mentioned earlier, we didn’t have a relationship with Tencent, and that would require a relationship with Tencent and information provided by Tencent. The Chinese social media platforms for us are — it’s fair to call them a black box; we just don’t have the same understanding of them as we do of some of the big American social media platforms.

Minister Gould testified that Canada did not enter relationships with Tencent or ByteDance (owner of TikTok) because they do not have offices in Canada. This lack of understanding of these platforms and the traffic on them created a significant vulnerability to interference and distribution of misinformation.”[31]

Political scientists highlight the challenge of differentiating between demands from foreign governments and those from transnational corporations.[32] To clarify these distinctions, the Canadian Government should establish clear legal boundaries for these corporations, streamlining compliance and reducing bureaucratic hurdles.

It is impractical for the government to maintain direct relationships with foreign companies. Instead, Canada could take cues from Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by amending data residency requirements, such as those under PIPEDA, to mandate that companies operating within Canada store and process data domestically.

Additionally, the telecommunications industry, which already possesses the technology to conduct Lawful Interception (LI), plays a critical role. LI is a security measure where service providers or network operators collect and furnish law enforcement with intercepted communications from private individuals or organizations, ensuring legal compliance and enhancing security measures.

3.   Members of diaspora communities vote from their best judgments

“Foreign interference damages our democracy by limiting discourse and removing voices from the democratic dialogue. It affects individual voters, most often members of diaspora communities, through acts of suppression or intimidation. Democratic freedom is often the very reason diaspora community members came to Canada. If a Canadian chose not to vote, was discouraged from voting, or voted in a particular manner because of foreign-organized compulsion, intimidation, or deceit, then foreign interference affected the integrity of the election. The freedom of every voter matters.”[33]

This statement lacks concrete proof of foreign-organized coercion, intimidation, or deception directed at Canadian residents. It is the government’s duty to shield residents from such coercion. Yet, it is also natural for members of diaspora communities to hold diverse, freely formed opinions. The government should avoid presuming that the voting decisions of diaspora community members are solely influenced by suppression or intimidation unless there is definitive evidence to support such a claim. Without solid proof, such assumptions can lead to discrimination based on national origin.

F. MP Erin O’Toole – Public Hearing (Day 9)

“Because I was informed in the run up to the campaign that there are 600,000 WeChat account users in British Columbia alone. And these are Canadians that don’t want the evening news, and don’t read the Global and Mail or the National Post. So they’re getting almost all of their information from channels that cannot be trusted.”[34]

The stereotype that the 600,000 Canadians using WeChat are not readers of English news is baseless. It’s crucial to recognize that this group consists not only of first-generation immigrants from China but also their descendants (whether born or raised in Canada) and non-Chinese individuals, many of whom maintain significant connections to China or the Chinese Canadian community and use WeChat.

For both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians, especially those born or raised in Canada, their proficiency in and use of English generally exceeds their use of Chinese. For these individuals, WeChat functions primarily as a communication tool, similar to other messaging apps, and they often rely on various English-language platforms for their main source of information.

Many first-generation immigrants from China who move to Canada through pathways like study, skilled migration, or work visas must demonstrate English proficiency to meet immigration requirements. Consequently, the claim by the former leader of the federal Conservative Party, MP Erin O’Toole, that these individuals do not engage with English news and rely solely on WeChat for information is unfounded.

While it’s true that some first-generation immigrants might struggle with English and have limited access to English news, it’s important to note that Canada is home to several reputable Chinese media outlets that are independent of the PRC. Outlets such as Sing Tao Daily, Ming Pao, AM1320, FM96.1, and OMNI under Rogers Communications cater to the multicultural landscape. These platforms are highly regarded sources of Chinese-language information for the Chinese Canadian community in British Columbia.

Dismissing the reality that 600,000 WeChat users in Canada might access English news and to assert they rely solely on “untrustworthy channels” fosters severe and inaccurate stereotypes. Relying on such speculative claims to debate foreign interference (FI) hampers efforts to genuinely understand the scope and impact of FI.

These stereotypes not only demonstrate a misunderstanding of the Chinese Canadian community by Mr. O’Toole but also insult the intelligence and integrity of the 600,000 WeChat users and the broader Chinese Canadian community, including the Chinese-language media in Canada. Mr. O’Toole’s approach unfairly questions the ability of Chinese Canadians to critically assess and evaluate information from varied sources, which is both disrespectful and demeaning.

G. MP Han Dong – Public Hearing (Days 8,9,12, and 13)

The main accusation against Han Dong is that during his party nomination, he hired buses to bring in Chinese students studying in Canada to vote. The accusation claims that these students, allegedly controlled by the Chinese government, used falsified identities to assist Han Dong in voting. However, this accusation lacks factual evidence and logical support.

1.   Renting buses for use in elections is a common practice.

From Dong’s case, the use of buses is considered irregular, but it is a common practice in political elections, as testified by Ted Lojko[35] and further supported by Azam Ishmael (then National Director of the Liberal Party)[36] and Jeremy Broadhurst (2019 National Campaign Director of the Liberal Party of Canada)[37]. Without understanding this unfamiliar political context, incorrect conclusions may be drawn.[38]

2.   The accusations against the international students lack factual evidence and logical support.

There is no concrete evidence to substantiate the claim that a group of international students, ineligible to vote in DVN, were pressured by PRC officials into using counterfeit IDs with incorrect addresses and transported by a bus arranged by PRC officials to vote for Dong using untraceable ballots. It is alleged that this coercion might have been implemented by Dong’s volunteers, potentially through door-to-door canvassing or phone calls.

  • The Federal Liberal Party allows students aged 14 and older in the electoral district to participate in nominations. [39]
  • Falsifying IDs for over 20 students would be challenging and very costly.
  • Voting stations were closely monitored by assistants from both candidates’ teams, and notably, Ms. Jiang, a Chinese Canadian candidate who almost won, did not raise any complaints.
  • Visas for international students are issued by Canadian authorities, not by the Chinese government. [40]
  • The claim that volunteers coerced voters is questionable. Volunteers typically do not have access to the voter list, which is restricted to a select few. The likelihood of coercion through door-to-door canvassing is low, particularly since Dong was present with the volunteers.[41]
  • It is impractical to force students to vote using unnamed ballots due to the required secrecy and confidentiality of the voting process.[42]

Human Right Coalition Lawyer Sarah Teich’s allegations involve repeated questioning to unearth evidence of Chinese international students being coerced or threatened by the PRC to vote for Dong during the DVN elections.[43] Associating the actions of international students with their country of origin and making speculative judgments of guilt represents a potential violation of human rights. Teich’s logic suggests a troubling inclination to view every Chinese Canadian with suspicion due to their connections to China, a perspective that undermines the principles of fairness and equality.

3.   The accusation that Dong asked the PRC to delay the release of the two Michaels needs real evidence to support it.

PMO Mr. Clow’s testimony discredited the information as faulty.[44] The Johnston report concluded the allegations were false.[45] Moreover, a recent court ruling in a civil lawsuit between Mr. Dong and Global News found no documented evidence supporting the accusations made against former Liberal MP Han Dong in a series of Global News stories last year.[46]

The alleged leak was derived from a summarized translation of a conversation, without a transcript being provided. [47]

H. Evidence Analysis Conclusion

Due to time constraints, we have not fully reviewed all documents published on the PIFI Commission’s website, nor have we examined all content from public hearings. However, from our thorough review of the materials, we find that, as stated in reports reviewing testimonies from those claiming foreign interference in Phase 1, “However, the government did not present evidence as to the on-the-ground impact of the interference.”[48]

Amid numerous claims and allegations of foreign interference, many of which lack solid factual or logical grounding and often rely on speculative and subjective judgments, there is a concerning tendency to perpetuate stereotypes about the Chinese Canadian community. These baseless accusations do more than just harm this community; they significantly jeopardize the integrity of Canada’s democratic system. The repercussions are serious, fostering increased anti-Asian discrimination and challenging the loyalty of the Chinese Canadian community. This atmosphere discourages Chinese Canadian voters from participating in elections, both as candidates and as voters, and dampens the public’s willingness to express their opinions freely. Such developments threaten the very foundations of our democratic principles.

In light of these critical issues, the Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group has solemnly prepared this report to address and curtail the spread of disinformation and misinformation. Our aim is to restore trust and participation within the Chinese Canadian community and to uphold the democratic values that define our nation.

Part III: Our Concerns and Final Thoughts

1.     Reviewing the history of exchanges between China and Canada – How to define foreign interference?

As Canadian citizens, we endorse the federal government’s efforts to investigate and legislate against foreign interference to protect our national security and democracy. However, defining foreign interference (FI) requires careful consideration, particularly when addressing the legitimate economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges between Canada and China. Since establishing diplomatic ties in 1970, our relations with China have evolved, notably strengthening under Prime Minister Paul Martin’s leadership to form a strategic partnership. In British Columbia, for instance, many influential figures who remain active in politics and community affairs have engaged closely with China.

Among them, Jenny Kwan, a NDP Member of Parliament, has been a frequent visitor to the Chinese consulate and the Chinese government. In February 2007, Kwan, who was then a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) for the British Columbia New Democratic Party (NDP), along with MLAs Mike Farnworth (now the Minister of Public Safety for BC) and Peter Julian (now the federal NDP House Leader), endorsed the nomination of Kaiping Diaolou and Villages in Guangdong, China, for World Heritage status.[49] Kwan and Farnworth also took the opportunity to attend the 50th anniversary celebration of the Guangdong Friendship Association.[50]

Since 2008, Kwan has frequently attended Chinese consulate events and has been interviewed by Chinese state media. In 2008, At the Chinese Consulate’s 2008 Spring Festival reception, Kwan listened to then-Consul General Yang Qiang’s speech “The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was successfully held, pointing the way forward for China’s future development.”[51] In December 2017, Kwan was interviewed by Xinhua News, China’s official state media, where she received praise from the Chinese government: “She called for the establishment of a Memorial Day to ensure the Nanjing Massacre is not forgotten in the West.” [52]

In May 2016, at the opening of her MP office in East Vancouver, Chinese Consul General Liu Fei was the only foreign official present.[53] In June 2018, Kwan lobbied for the Guangdong provincial delegation when their visas were denied, questioning the Liberal Immigration Minister in Parliament.[54]

As a senior advisor for the federal NDP and a member of the Canadian Chinese Human Rights Monitoring Group, Mr. Gabriel Yiu has had extensive interactions with Chinese state media and enterprises with military backgrounds. In February 2013, at the Chinese New Year gathering of cultural figures from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Canada in Vancouver, Yiu reached a cooperation agreement in the film sector with Jiang Yingchun, General Manager of the Chinese state-owned Poly Culture Group. Additionally, Yiu presented guests with the documentary “Jewel of Western Canada— BC Agriculture,” produced in 2007 with the help of the BC NDP and Shandong Television, which involved sensitive areas of BC’s agricultural sector, and he accompanied the entire process.[55]

Notably, Thekla Lit is another member of the Canadian Concern Group on Human Rights Violations by the CCP. Since 2000, she has organized multiple trips for Canadian teachers to China to study history. She has also received a Special Contribution Award from the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, an official institution in China.[56]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, former Vancouver Mayor Kennedy Stewart was moved by a briefing from Chinese Consul General Tong Xiaoling on China’s anti-epidemic efforts, He also stated that he would report to Premier Horgan and Prime Minister Trudeau to provide as much medical supply assistance as possible.[57]

At the federal level, in 2018, then-Federal Conservative MP Bob Saroya, as a representative leader, visited the Beijing Administration Institute, aka Beijing Municipal Party Committee School, accompanied by the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China. Bob Saroya expressed his hope to leverage his Canadian resources to explore further cooperation with the party school, and both sides discussed potential areas and forms of collaboration. [58]

These are just a few examples. How should the identity of Chinese Canadians be recognized, and how should foreign interference be defined? In a 2014 interview with a Chinese-language media outlet, MP Jenny Kwan stated that Chinese culture, language, and traditions are inherent, and her journey to rediscover her roots helped her realize the significance of being Chinese.[59] In 2011, when Harper government intelligence chief Richard Fadden claimed to have a list of over a thousand Chinese spies, Kwan argued that if the issue was serious, evidence should be presented, and illegal activities should be investigated and prosecuted rather than tarnishing the reputation of a specific ethnic community. This, she said, aligns with Canada’s legal principles.[60]

In Bill C-70, the concept of FI is still very vague. If the explanation given by the “Yellow River Report” approved by Mr. Kenny Chiu at the night when Bill C-282 was proposed is followed, there is no doubt that the behavior of the politicians mentioned above is worthy of being investigated – since they have frequent and in-depth contacts with the PRC, what impact has it received from PRC or CCP?

But apparently, several of them are now extremely active in anti-FI activities, making accusations of FI against some people who have no contact with the PRC government or whose contact is much less deep and frequent than they do. This is even more confusing – what is the basis for judging or doubting FI?

2. Suppressing voices that diverge from the mainstream poses a threat to democracy in Canada.

Canada’s democratic system and Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantee equality and freedom for Canadians. However, recent investigations into foreign interference have revealed baseless attacks by media, politicians, and some individuals against those whose voices and views are different from the so-called mainstream.

A prominent example is the attack on Senator Victor Oh and Senator Yuen Pau Woo, both are of Chinese origin but came from Malaysia and Singapore respectively. The Canadian Senate plays a crucial role and is not merely symbolic; Senators, including Oh and Woo, scrutinize legislation from the House of Commons. Part of a senator’s duty is to question bills and uncover their flaws and potential societal risks. Yet, when Oh and Woo exercises this responsibility, some media and individuals question their loyalty to Canada and label them working for Beijing. Such attacks on Senators fulfilling their roles undermine Canada’s political system and institutions.

If unfounded accusations like these become prevalent in English media, they could fundamentally damage Canadian democracy. Imagine, if privileged Senators could face slander, abuse, and accusations of disloyalty or treason simply for expressing their views while performing their duties, how could ordinary citizens then enjoy freedom of speech and thought?

 

Footnotes:

[1] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Jenny_Kwan.pdf, P3, August 28, 2021: Vancouver East Campaign Event for Liberal Candidate

[2] “At this point, Ms. Kwan began to wonder whether a foreign actor such as the CCP – had covered the difference between the reported and likely cost of the event.” https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Jenny_Kwan.pdf, P7

[3] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN000144.pdf

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFA0pB-PTMA

[5] “这个集体可以是政府机构也可以是政治机构、政治文化机构”.

[6] “任何人、任何机构,只要你居住在加拿大,直接、间接,正式或非正式,受外国政府操纵,为外国政府进行活动,都要登记。”

[7] “华人社团的头、侨领”

[8] “根据c-282,只要是为了外国机构进行活动,无论是有意还是无意,正式还是非正式,就符合外国代理人定义,就要在十天之内登记注册”。并举例说明,“比如温哥华的文化参赞告诉这里的一个个人或者一个在BC注册的团体,让他们在中秋节或中国国庆节或者春假搞活动,这个个人或团体搞了这个活动,就符合外国代理人注册的定义。” “帮助PRC文化部在温哥华办春节演出的本地机构属于外国代理人,应该登记。”

[9]  https://www.vansky.com/news/jgxw/191589.html

[10] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN000144.pdf, P6

[11] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/XuXtMeR6CYVOF3WKNZSEIg

[12] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/PGv4bnnSzU89URhwmN8eMg

[13] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000014.EN.pdf, P9

[14] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000014.EN.pdf, P10.

[15] https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art15.html

[16] https://www.youtube.com/live/8yJAcdDI6dc, 37’25’’

[17] https://charliesmithvancouver.substack.com/p/memo-to-the-media-richmondsteveston/comments?_refluxos=a10

[18] https://www.richmond-news.com/federal-election-archive/tory-candidate-kenny-chiu-avoids-questions-on-inappropriate-sexuality-3019788

[19] https://www.straight.com/news/1303221/conservative-candidate-kenny-chiu-sat-board-bible-college-opposed-homosexual-activity

[20] https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e

[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOrM4kyHjfE&t=2123s

[22] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Michael_Chong_factual_phase_stage_1_submissions_2024-04-15__revised_.pdf, P19

[23] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/politicians-anti-china-language-prompted-anti-asian-violence-battlegro-rcna124508

[24] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Michael_Chong_factual_phase_stage_1_submissions_2024-04-15__revised_.pdf, P20

[25] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Erin_O_Toole.pdf , P8

[26] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000036.001.pdf, P7

[27] https://www.vansky.com/news/jgxw/191589.html

[28]  Christopher Cochrane, Kelly Blidook, and Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics:  Critical Approaches, 8th edition, Nelson Education Ltd, Toronto, P132, chapter 6, ethnocultural minorities

[29] https://info.vanpeople.com/1256689.html

[30] https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf

[31] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Erin_O_Toole.pdf , P10

[32] Christopher Cochrane, Kelly Blidook, and Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics:  Critical Approaches, 8th edition, Nelson Education Ltd, Toronto, P206, chapter 10, Canada’s external environment: the United States and the world

[33] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Erin_O_Toole.pdf, P10

[34] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_9_-_April_3__2024_-_English_Interpretation.pdf , P30, Line 10

[35] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf, D 8, P189, Line 26

[36]

https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf , D 8, P 20, Line 17 – P 23, Line 14

[37] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-_April_9_2024_-_Floor_transcript.pdf , D13, P 161, Line 12 – P164, Line 10

[38] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.SUM.000003.pdf, P2, item1

[39] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-_April_9_2024_-_Floor_transcript.pdf, D13, P164, L12

[40] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf, D8, P192, L12

[41] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf , D8, P199, L28

[42] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf , D8, P101, L27; D8, P166, L17

[43] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_8_-April_2__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf , D8 P201, L19; D8, P102, L14

[44] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-_April_9_2024_-_Floor_transcript.pdf , D13, P176, L23

[45] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/COM0000104.pdf , P30

[46] https://www.thecanadianpressnews.ca/entertainment/judge-finds-no-documentation-to-support-global-news-reporting-on-han-dong-allegations/article_b87ca088-1377-5d9f-9202-95c8f5ce9021.html

[47] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-_April_9_2024_-_Floor_transcript.pdf , D13, P166, L13

[48] https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Submissions/Factual_Phase/Churchill_Society.pdf, P3

[49] http://www.chinanews.com.cn/hr/mzhrxw/news/2007/02-05/868443.shtml

[50] SAAHCAG01

[51] http://vancouver.china-consulate.gov.cn/news/200802/t20080205_4885460.htm

[52] http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2017-12/11/c_1122094191.htm

[53] https://info.vanpeople.com/555919.html

[54] https://www.canadanewsreport.com/2018/06/04/2187/

[55] https://info.vanpeople.com/240070.html

[56] http://www.china918.org/news/read?id=377

[57] http://www.chinaqw.com/m/hqhr/2020/03-02/247522.shtml

[58] https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/cCUwrPdKEr9KMBMWFuPSxA

[59]  https://www.bcbay.com/life/immigration/2014/09/21/272429.html

[60] https://blog.jackjia.com/?p=18498